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AFTE R TH E R EASONAB LE MAN:
G E T T I N G OV E R T H E S U B J E CT I V I T Y /
O B J E CT I V I T Y Q U E S T I O N
Victoria Nourse*

This article challenges the conventional notion of the “reasonable man.” It
argues that we make a category mistake when we adopt the metaphor of a
human being as the starting point for analysis of the criminal law and instead
offers an alternate approach based on heuristic theory, reconceiving the reasonable man as a heuristic that serves as the site for debate over majoritarian
norms. The article posits that the debate over having a purely subjective standard and a purely objective standard obscures the commonsense necessity of
having a hybrid standard, one which takes into account the characteristics of
a particular defendant at the same time that it provides normative guidance.
The analysis then proceeds to examine what happens when this hybrid standard is applied to the problem of the reasonable woman. The article concludes
by arguing that equality would be better served by a normative analysis rather
than one mired in the subjectivity/objectivity debate.
There is no more important criminal law concept than the “reasonable
man.” The law of murder, duress, provocation, and self-defense depend
upon it. Despite its importance, the criminal law’s “reasonable man” is
undertheorized in the standard criminal law literature. Aside from major
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contributions from George Fletcher and Cynthia Lee,1 the “reasonable
man” has suffered from fixation upon questions that have led to impasse.
Long ago, the criminal law academy appears to have decided that the
single most important question about the reasonable man was whether
we should require a standard that is “objective or subjective.” This
debate finds its way into the criminal law casebook as a question of the
“characteristics” of the reasonable person.2 As I hope to show in this
paper, this scholarly convention is not the kind of theorization that the
“reasonable person” needs; it is time to get over the “subjectivity/objectivity” question.
Here, I want to issue a very basic challenge: scholars have made an analytic mistake in believing that the reasonable man is a person. The reasonable
man is an institutional heuristic,3 and it is a heuristic whose anthropomorphic form has tended to obscure important questions. In this paper, I
reconsider the reasonable person as both release and restraint of majoritarian norms. I then compare the standardized individualist view (which
focuses on characteristics) with a more institutionally realist (and ecologically rational) approach. Finally, I conclude with some remarks on the cost
of anthropomorphizing the inquiry, with particular attention to the
debate about the reasonable woman.
One initial note: the title of this paper is intended to provoke a predictable response. If the author is a woman and she says something about
the “reasonable man,” then many will assume that she must be arguing for
a “reasonable woman” standard in the criminal law. In fact, I aim to disavow such an approach as alone adequate to reveal the criminal law’s
inequalities. I am distinctly skeptical that feminists advance their cause by
perpetuating the “identity characteristics” debate; I am even more skeptical of feminist critics who seem to have constructed the great questions of
battered women in terms of their subjectivity—as if to delegitimize the
inquiry from the start by rendering violence a matter of “her perception.”
In the end, this anthropomorphizing move does more to obscure than
1. Cynthia Lee, Murder and the Reasonable Man (2003); George P. Fletcher, The Right and
the Reasonable, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 949 (1985).

2. John Kaplan et al., Criminal Law: Cases and Materials 630–48 (3d ed. 1996); Sanford
H. Kadish et al., Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and Materials 801–26 (6th ed.
1995).
3. See Heuristics and the Law (Gigerenzer & Engel eds., 2006).
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reveal: equality takes two, it is inherently comparative.4 It cannot be found
in the minds or hearts of individuals, male or female.
The important question is “not whether the law has become too soft or
subjectified but what we mean by its objectivity.”5 That question cannot
be answered by referring solely to the text of the law, for no law is selfapplying. The question can only be answered by confronting the ways in
which law moves from rule to context. The law as applied is mediated, it
is bent, by the norms of culture, of family and sex and race. The basic
assumption of this paper (elaborated elsewhere) is that the move from rule
to context depends upon heuristics.

I . T H E S U B J E CT I V E / O B J E CT I V E R E A S O N A B L E
M A N D E BAT E

There has been a consensus among American criminal law scholars that
the question of objective and subjective standards in the criminal law is
ubiquitous and important. If one looks at the standard casebooks that
have been used for the past twenty years, one sees the debate literally littered throughout the pages, in discussions of doctrines as varied as negligence, provocation, and self-defense. Traditionally, the inquiry has taken
the form of a question of the “identity” of the reasonable person: whether
we should conclude, for example, that the reasonable person should
include characteristics of age (the reasonable young male) or sex (the reasonable woman) or culture (the reasonable Asian woman).6
The first question I want to ask about this scholarly convention is what
is at stake. After all, the real live doctrine (as opposed to the casebooks’
version of the doctrine) suggests that this is quite literally an academic

4. Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of Egalitarian Norms, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 693 (2000).
5. V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1235, 1236 (2001).
6. See Director of Public Prosecutions v. Camplin, 2 All E.R. 168 (1978) (fifteen-yearold boy who had been raped raising question whether he should be held to a standard of
a reasonable person of his age); State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wa. 1977) (jury instruction
on reasonable man rejected on ground that it was sex discrimination); People v. Wu, 286
Cal. Rptr. 868, 884 (Cal. App. 1991) (reversed, in part, for failure to give instruction on
Asian culture relevant in part to reasonableness of provocation) (opinion ordered depublished).
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debate: a majority of jurisdictions adopt a standard that is both objective
and subjective (a “hybrid” standard).7 This reflects common sense; taken
to extremes, no one really wants a standard that is completely subjective
or completely objective. If the subjective component of the reasonable
man standard includes the norms of the defendant, then we might as well
not have a trial (the defendant’s norms will acquit him). So, too, if we
eliminate any contextual component, we might as well throw away the
criminal code and the jailer’s keys: extreme versions of the objective standard could bar consideration of physical facts such as a deadly threat, or
obviously relevant physical characteristics (e.g., the defendant was in a
wheelchair). Given this problem of extremes, the Model Penal Code and
a majority of jurisdictions adopt some form of “hybrid” standard: the jury
must judge the defendant by the standards of the reasonable person, but
the reasonable person in the “situation.”8
So, then, what’s the real beef about an objective-and-subjective standard?
The subjective/objective debate creates theoretical tensions. First, such a
standard appears to unite opposites. Objectivity suggests rule-like characteristics; subjectivity suggests standard-like flexibility. Second, the subjective/
objective debate appears to conflate fact and norm: objectivity suggests a
norm-like inquiry about rules; subjectivity suggests an inquiry into minds
or facts—an implication heightened by those who emphasize the “characteristics” question. In my own view, we must be cautious lest these tensions
turn out to be generated by the anthropomorphic form of the inquiry; we
need to ask whether the form generates tensions that, conceived differently,
might disappear. For example, do we create the fact/norm problem by
embedding a normative question in factual guise—the characteristics of a
person? Similarly, do we create the rules/standard dilemma by placing the

7. See, e.g., State v. Bellino, 625 A.2d 1381, 1384 (Conn. App. 1993) (“It is settled that a
jury’s evaluation of a claim of self-defense has both subjective and objective elements.”).
As Holly Maguigan notes, appellate courts sometimes obscure this dualism by using misleading terms for their own standards, using the term “subjective,” for example, to describe
a standard that is both subjective and objective, or using the term “objective” to describe
a similar standard. Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and
Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379, 410 (1991) (explaining that a majority of states use a combined standard).
8. Model Penal Code § 2.202 (2)(c)–(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (defining recklessly and negligently with reference to the “actor’s situation”).
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normative question within the guise of a human being, thus suggesting subjectivity? We should at least be concerned that the opposition in the criminal law between subjectivity and objectivity is no more helpful or illuminating than it is elsewhere, in anthropology, history or social theory. As
Pierre Bourdieu has bemoaned: “Of all the oppositions that artificially
divide social science, the most fundamental, and the most ruinous, is the
one that is set up between subjectivism and objectivism.”9

I I. R E LEAS E AN D R E STRAI NT OF MAJ OR ITAR IAN N OR M S

Consider a different way of thinking about the reasonable person—as a
heuristic for law’s institutional aims. Heuristics depend upon ecological
rationality which, roughly, means “fit” with the basic relations of the
underlying context. Logical failures (where logic is measured by abstract
symmetry for example) are not the measure of ecological rationality;
instead, rationality is determined by the structure and aims of the institution in the specific decisional context. To give a quick example: a doctor
who admits patients to a hospital who are experiencing chest pain does
not stop to do regression analysis; he uses “fast and frugal” heuristics to
assess the next course of treatment. One might devise a system aimed to
optimize the information and decision making, considering all possible
factors, but that system would fail the standards of contextual or ecological rationality demanded by the situation. In a world of uncertainty,
heuristics are essential and in assessing their rationality, context is crucial.10
The reasonable person is a heuristic that, as we will see, serves multiple
purposes. For the purposes of adjudicating the relationship of the defendant to the state, two features of the criminal law are essential. First, the
norms applied must be majoritarian; a jury that applies Stalinist norms to
the defendant violates basic rules of our constitutional order. Second, it
must individualize. It must consider the defendant “in the situation,” in
the context. This again is consistent with our general notions of due
process that require that each defendant’s case be determined based on her

9. Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice 25 (Richard Nice trans., 1990).
10. Gerg Gigerenzer, Heuristics, in Heuristics and the Law, supra note 3, at 17, 24–28
(coronary care example).
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own actions.11 Viewed in this light, the “reasonable person” inquiry delegates to majorities’ surrogate (the jury) the right to bridge the law as positive enterprise (the codes) and the defendant’s actual situation (context)
by applying situational or application norms. By and large, the aim is to
elicit a law which both reflects and restrains majoritarian norms. The jury
must impose punishment, but in doing so must quell outrage, restrain
vengeance, submit to law’s guidance. This is a lot for a single metaphorical person to handle—too much, I suggest, for the current anthropomorphized form of the doctrine. That form “flattens” analytically separate
inquiries; a la Fletcher,12 the heuristic I have devised is a “structured”
inquiry, a two step process in which the second step qualifies the first.
To bring this down to earth, let us consider one of the iconic cases in the
debates about subjective and objective standards: the sad tale of Judy Norman.
This was a rather extreme and indeed anomalous case, but one regularly productive of dispute in the law and in the classroom about the nature of the “reasonable person.” Norman was subject to what can only be described as a kind
of domestic tyranny involving years of degrading abuse in which she was prostituted, deprived of food, made to sleep on the floor and driven to attempt
suicide, before she finally killed her husband in his sleep.13 The appellate
11. These institutional aims appear to conflict; like a supply and demand curve, we are
seeking what amounts to an equilibrium of intersecting concerns. This is what I would call
a “productive contradiction” since it is demanded by the context, the ecological rationality
of the situation.
12. On the difference between flat and structured reasoning, see Fletcher, supra note 1.
13. See Jane Maslow Cohen, Regimes of Private Tyranny: What Do They Mean to
Morality and for the Criminal Law? 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 757 (1996). The court explained the
facts as follows:
The defendant testified that . . . [h]is physical abuse of her consisted of frequent assaults that
included slapping, punching and kicking her, striking her with various objects, and throwing
glasses, beer bottles and other objects at her. . . . [O]ther specific incidents of abuse [included] her husband putting her cigarettes out on her, throwing hot coffee on her, breaking glass
against her face and crushing food on her face. . . . The defendant’s evidence also tended to
show . . . that her husband did not work and forced her to make money by prostitution, and
that he made humor of that fact to family and friends. He would beat her if she resisted going
out to prostitute herself or if he was unsatisfied with the amounts of money she made. He routinely called the defendant “dog,” “bitch” and “whore,” and on a few occasions made her eat
pet food out of the pets’ bowls and bark like a dog. He often made her sleep on the floor. At
times, he deprived her of food and refused to let her get food for the family. During those years
of abuse, the defendants’ husband threatened numerous times to kill her and to maim her in
various ways.

State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. 1989).
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court concluded that she was not entitled to a jury instruction on complete
self-defense, and scholars have been at some pains to try to resolve the ensuing debate about the case. Many sympathize with Judy Norman but find it
difficult to avoid the court’s conclusion that there was no immediate threat
at the time Judy Norman killed. Her husband wasn’t standing over her with
the knife—he was in a “defenseless” posture, asleep.14
The foil to the Norman drama is a rather unsympathetic defendant, the
subway vigilante, Bernhard Goetz.15 Goetz shot at four African-American
youths on a subway after one of them approached him and said, “Give me
five dollars.”16 Goetz testified “that he knew from the smile on [the teenager’s] face that they wanted to ‘play with me.’ Although he was certain that
none of the youths had a gun, he had a fear, based on prior experiences, of
being ‘maimed.’ Goetz then established ‘a pattern of fire’ . . . . His stated
intention at that point was to ‘murder [the youths], to hurt them, to make
them suffer as much as possible.’”17
Goetz and Norman generate strong emotions and vivid arguments.
How, it is asked, could “reasonable women” kill men in their sleep? How
could “reasonable men” gun down African-American boys? Persons making these arguments are invoking the strong “objective” rule-bound version of the reasonable man. But there are counterarguments: How could
the reasonable man subject his wife to such degradation and torture? May
not a kidnap victim kill his kidnapper, and a slave her slavemaster, when
there is no imminent threat? If the victim has experienced prior violence,
shouldn’t that be considered by a reasonable person in determining
whether the threat was “imminent”? Rightly or wrongly, such arguments
are characterized as ones invoking the “subjective” version of the rule.
Notice the ubiquity of the term “reasonableness” in the claims and notice
that they appear to lead to no fixed conclusion other than to shuttle back
and forth between claims for the defendant or the victim.

14. Id. at 9.
15. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986); see George Fletcher, A Crime of SelfDefense: Berhnard Goetz and the Law on Trial (1990). For frequent comparisons, see
Ronald N. Boyce et al., Criminal Law and Procedure 940–54 (1999); Kaplan et al., supra
note 2, at 609–36; Phillip E. Johnson et al., Criminal Law: Cases, Materials, and Text
379–88 (1995).
16. Goetz, 497 N.E. 2d at 43.
17. Id. at 44.
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Both Norman and Goetz raise questions of prior victimization. First,
let us consider it framed as a question of the reasonable person: Is prior
victimization a “characteristic” of the reasonable person? One can hear the
response almost immediately: most people are not crime victims and
therefore it would be inappropriate to consider prior victimization in
either Norman or Goetz. If this is correct, notice its consequences—it
makes battered women disappear in the law of self-defense. Most women
aren’t battered, most battered women do not suffer deadly violence, just as
most people are not mugging victims. Can this be right? The answer is no:
for long periods of time, prior threats have been admitted in evidence (this
is the law without regard to battered women). But if that is correct, we
must accept that the “characteristics” inquiry can steer us in directions that
the law disavows (if nothing else by failing to specify the background
against which reasonableness is being measured). In short, it suggests that
there is something more that needs to be elaborated; that we need to know
precisely the norm by which we are judging “reasonableness,” whether it
is the statistical norm of the average or ideal or something else entirely.
This example shows how the “characteristics” question, in its aim to be
normatively agnostic, may yield results quite at odds with standard legal
doctrine. For one thing, to the extent that the characteristics question is
seen as a factual claim, it suggests a factual inquiry like looking at the color
of hair or eyes—and so the student or scholar goes to look for facts about
the underlying claim. As we have seen, that inquiry—what characteristics
a defendant has—does nothing to bar hypermajoritarism because it is
agnostic about the standard of reasonableness in use. If one judges criminal defendants and defenses and even offenses by the standards of most
people, they will always come up short because crime is an anomalous
affair. And lest this seem anomalous, even the great scholars of the criminal law have made arguments which appear to rely upon the statistical
norm of the law-abiding as baseline. As George Fletcher once wrote about
the strangeness of the provocation defense: “the reasonable person does not
kill at all, even under provocation.”18 Likewise, Glanville Williams, upon
whom Fletcher relied, famously asked: “[H]ow can it be admitted that that
paragon of virtue, the reasonable man, gives way to provocation?”19 Such a

18. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law § 4.2.1, at 247 (1978).
19. Glanville Williams, Provocation and the Reasonable Man, 1954 Crim. L. Rev. 740, 742.
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view of “reasonableness” assumes as a baseline the law-abiding citizens’
behavior rather than the set of those who commit criminal acts, the
proverbial Holmesian bad actors. As a result it risks precisely what it seeks
to avoid: a hypermajoritarism that is defied by criminal law as it is traditionally taught and understood.
Now, let us frame this debate in the terms of a heuristic that is not flattened or made into a fact about the characteristics of a person, but which
acknowledges a structured, two step, normative process: the “release and
restraint” approach. The law wants to release majoritarian application
norms and, at the same time, restrain excesses and, in particular, to question whether the excess of majoritarian norms yields oppression or bias.
Reconsider Norman and Goetz. The release of majoritarian norms here
suggests in both cases that neither should kill; that there should be no rule
that allows women to kill sleeping husbands any more than allows whites
to gun down blacks. The second prong of the inquiry calls the first into
question, however: it asks whether applying the majoritarian norm has
risks for excessive retribution and refusal to individualize and, most
importantly, whether the majoritarian norm properly accounts for the
context of the claims.
We can see this most easily when we look at the original problems that
faced battered women in the law. For some time, feminists argued that
women were wrongly being denied the full opportunity to explain their
experience of battering. But why was that? At least since the nineteenth
century, courts have admitted evidence of prior threats and violence
between the parties, not to mention the victim’s character for violence, as
relevant to self-defense.20 If, in the days of the O.K. Corral, one admitted

20. Past threats and violence, including the victim’s character for violence, have been
considered highly relevant to a claim of self-defense on questions of imminence and aggression and the nature of the threat. Allison v. United States, 160 U.S. 203, 215 (1895) (prior
threats relevant to “whether defendant had reasonable cause to apprehend an attack fatal
to life, or fraught with great bodily injury . . . [The threats] were [also] relevant because
indicating cause for apprehension of danger and reason for promptness to repel attack.”);
People v. Thomson, 28 P. 589, 590 (Cal. 1891) (“[A]ll the acts and conduct of the deceased,
either in the nature of overt acts of hostility, or threats communicated or uncommunicated, were proper evidence to be considered by the jury as shedding light . . . upon the issue
as to whether the deceased or the defendant was the aggressor. . . . These principles are elementary in criminal law, and a citation of authorities not demanded.”).
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evidence of prior threats and violence, why should it be barred in the case
of battered women? The answer is that it should not have been barred.
Then why was it? It was barred because of social norms that mediate law
application, that come into play “between” the rules of self-defense and
the individual case, norms that mean that the law is applied one way for
standard cases involving women and another way for standard cases
involving men. These norms do not come from the law, they come from
the ecological rationality of other institutions, in this case, habits about
how we view women, men and the family, which are silently invoked in
law application as cultural default rules.
I have described this elsewhere as the “veil of relationship,” the way
in which relational norms between men and women, the institution of
the family and gender, mediate and swamp law application.21 In the
1970s and 1980s, some early courts were open enough to explain the
chain of reasoning (however perverse it may seem today). In the case of
Commonwealth v. Watson, the defendant’s husband was on top of her
(according to an eyewitness) when she killed, but the trial judge found
that the threat was not “imminent.”22 How could this be? How more
imminent could a threat be, than when the victim was “on top” of her?
The court explained that threat was not imminent because of “the parties’ relationship involving ‘a long course of physical abuse.’” What logic
makes the “long course of abuse” a factor which undermines, rather than
supports, claims of self-defense? The apparent logic, gleaned from the
case as a whole, was the judgment that the threat was not imminent
because Mrs. Watson should have left the relationship before the final

21. See Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 Yale L.J. 1331 (1997).
22. Commonwealth v. Watson, 431 A.2d 949, 951 (Pa. 1981); see id. (relating eyewitness testimony that the victim had the defendant “around the neck” and was “on top of
her” when she shot). The appellate court emphasized the centrality of imminence to the
trial court’s reasoning and to the case: “The central issue in this case stems from the trial
court’s finding that appellant’s belief that she was in imminent danger of death or great
bodily harm at the time of the shooting was unreasonable.” Watson is a classic case in
which imminence takes on the meaning of “alternatives,” as the court appears to have
based its conclusion on the notion that she could have “avoided” the situation by leaving
the relationship, rather than the notion that there was a space of time between the threat
and the killing.
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attack.23 The rule of imminence became a rule not of time, but of the
human relationships we know as family and gender. As a matter of law,
the trial court’s conclusion was wrong and was reversed on appeal.24
(Indeed, if such a rule were the law, battered women would have only one
shot to claim self-defense; after the first deadly blow, she would have a
duty to exit the relationship; this means, of course, that battered women
do not exist for the law of self-defense: for if she exits, she does not need
self-defense and if she stays she will not be able to invoke it.)
The important thing to gather from this experience is how the repetitive nature of the violence in the home made people view it differently;
violence excludable in the case of the battered woman was fully admissible in the case of the O.K. Corral. My basic point here is that to deny the
introduction of prior violence in battered woman cases is to risk creating
a double standard: if prior violence has for long periods of time been
introduced in cases against men, then why shouldn’t it be introduced in
cases against women? Indeed, it seems fairly clear that such a double standard (of law as applied) should violate the equal protection clause.
Notice that in arguing about this, I have invoked neither the notion of
the subjective or the objective. I have simply compared rules applicable to
repetitive violence for men and women. There is nothing remotely subjective about this; one need not then attempt to justify a “subjective” standard
in the woman’s case (and precisely because she doesn’t need one, one need
not ask the question whether Goetz should be judged by a subjective standard).25 But this is not how the law of prior threats was argued when it first

23. Many courts have acknowledged that, even if the law of retreat does not apply, the
question of “leaving the relationship” has had extraordinary influence in cases involving battered women. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 486 S.E.2d 819, 822 (Ga. 1997) (expert testimony
needed to explain why the defendant “would not leave her mate”); State v. Koss, 551
N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ohio 1990) (assuming ordinary person’s “perception that a woman in a
battering relationship is free to leave at any time”); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 377 (N.J.
1984) (noting a “crucial issue of fact” was “why, given such allegedly severe and constant
beatings, combined with threats to kill, defendant had not long ago left decedent”).
24. Watson, 431 A.2d at 951.
25. At common law, Goetz’s claims of prior violence would be irrelevant because they
were generalized claims of fear based on the acts of others, not the acts of the victims. See,
e.g., State v. Hampton, 558 N.W.2d 884 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (defendant’s “psycho-social”
history of past violence towards him not admissible except in cases where past violence
involved victim).
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emerged as an issue in battered woman’s cases in the 1970s; following the
general trend toward subjectivity, litigants relied on “expert” testimony to
bolster the defendants’ claims. In this form, the criminal law debates continue to this day, arguing whether battered woman syndrome is a good or
bad thing, whether it is a syndrome or law, etc. Along the way, we have forgotten that a standard which would have eliminated prior threats for battered women but allowed them for men at the O.K. Corral is not a matter
of psychology or a particular woman’s perception, but basic inequality.
Now, let us consider the more difficult question raised by the Norman
case itself—the absence of an imminent threat. The imminence inquiry can
actually take many forms; as I have written elsewhere, time can operate as
a proxy for everything from threat to retreat.26 Let us simply summarize the
concern as follows: defendants should attempt to avoid the use of violence
(whether this takes the form of a doctrinal requirement of retreat, imminence, or threat). Now, apply the subjective/objective question: would or
could a reasonable person have avoided the violence in Norman? The
answer is obviously yes. But isn’t that true of Goetz as well? He might have
walked away, pulled the emergency stop cord, or called for help. But few
are attracted to this argument with the same insistence that it is asserted in
Norman’s case; and no one would say that there was no “imminent” threat
in Goetz’s case because these alternatives were available to him.
Now let us shift to the institutional heuristic I have suggested above. Let
us assume that our ideal application norm (a majoritarian norm) says
“choose alternatives other than violence.” Now consider how and why we
might want to restrain that norm. Remember the Watson case above, where
we saw that the court seemed to suggest that the threat was not “imminent”
because of the parties’ relationship—that in essence imposed a duty on battered women to avoid the violence by leaving the relationship. The risk is
that the “avoid the violence” rule will be translated by the jury into a very
different rule in the battering context: a rule to “avoid the relationship.”27
Avoiding the relationship, however, is not the law. A defendant may have

26. Nourse, supra note 6.
27. The importance of battered woman syndrome testimony has always been to try to
correct this problem (indeed, under this view, battered woman syndrome testimony,
viewed as a set of norms rather than psychological facts, may actually be required by the
equal protection clause). For a more extended argument about the “legal” nature of the
syndrome, see Nourse, supra note 6.
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a duty to retreat from a confrontation but that is quite different from
retreating from a place or home or relationship. There is no rule that
defendants, male or female, must leave the situation as opposed to retreat
from the confrontation: a man who goes into a violent part of town or a
violent bar is not asked why he went, or why he did not leave.28 As Richard
Rosen so colorfully put it, “No matter how clear it was to Gary Cooper
that somebody would end up dead if he did not leave before the train carrying his enemy arrived at ‘High Noon,’ our culture allows him to stay in
town and affords him the right to kill in self-defense when the bad guys
come after him.”29
To see the double standard emerge in more contemporary form, consider how strange it would be to ask the same question in Goetz’s case.
Should Goetz’s self-defense claim be barred because he should not have
taken the subway? As he emphasized, he was quite aware of the risks of
mugging. Again, we see how a legal rule that on its face is equal becomes
unequally applied through the mediation of social institutions governing
the context. For reasons that may seem unfathomable today, the law of old
tended to find battered women contributory negligent in cases involving
their own oppression, ruling “as if ” she were responsible for provoking the
violence or that she should have avoided the violence. The result is a
strange and violent version of the marital unity rule in which, if the battered woman stayed, she wasn’t to complain and if she was to go, she had
no need to complain. In either case, leaving or staying, she was not entitled to claim self-defense.
Now, let us turn to what in the end makes Norman’s case different from
Goetz’s and may make her claim far more plausible than is generally
believed. We know that the imminence rule is not invariable; we know
that in situations where the defendant is kidnapped, he need not wait
until the knife is literally over his head. One form of this argument, one
that Goetz made, was that he had in effect been abandoned by the state,

28. See, e.g., Ball v. State, 14 S.W. 1012, 1013 (Tex. Ct. App. 1890) (“Defendant’s presence at the place where the killing occurred could not, under the circumstances, constitute
provocation to the deceased.”); State v. Bristol, 84 P.2d 757, 766 (Wyo. 1938) (holding that
the defendant had no duty to avoid entering a bar where he knew his adversary, who had
threatened to attack him, to be drinking).
29. Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their
Batterers, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 371, 396 (1993).
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to a state of nature. He claimed that the state had not protected him from
prior muggings, just as Norman might have argued that she was not protected from prior beatings. Does this mean that every victim gets a pass to
become a vigilante? No. The answer is that Norman’s case is in fact different because of the cultural norms that mediate law’s application.
After an escalating series of events in which police were called but did
not arrest her husband, Judy Norman tried to kill herself. When emergency personnel were called, her husband told them to let her die. In
response to what amounted to a felony threat, the emergency personnel
told Mr. Norman to go back to the house. The next day, after unsuccessfully seeking help from mental health officials and social service employees, Norman returned to her home, and that night killed her husband.30
Norman’s best claim here is that her case is not one of simple prior victimization, but that she suffered from an ongoing course of felony conduct to which the authorities not only did nothing when done in their
presence (let her die), but acted in ways suggesting that there was no violation of law. In such a world, the question is whether Norman can be
analogized to one who, quite literally, has been remitted to a state of
nature where the government has abandoned her to the government of her
murderous husband, with no legal recourse.31 At the very least, the skeptical part of our inquiry must ask whether, given the state’s systematic failure to enforce laws purporting to protect women, we must allow the jury

30. On the day before the killing, “sheriff’s deputies were called to the Norman residence, and the defendant complained that her husband had been beating her all day and
she could not take it anymore. The defendant was advised to file a complaint, but she said
she was afraid her husband would kill her if she had him arrested. The deputies told her
they needed a warrant before they could arrest her husband, and they left the scene. The
deputies were called back less than an hour later after the defendant had taken a bottle of
pills. The defendant’s husband cursed her and called her names as she was attended by
paramedics, and he told them to let her die. [Then the officers] chased him back into his
house. . . .” State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. 1989).
31. Lest this seem extreme, one must remember that there is a long history of political
theory that lived into the twentieth century in which a woman was not entitled to vote
precisely because her husband was her “governor.” Indeed, the family can, in a strange way,
be seen as the font of political theory in America. John Locke wrote his great treatises
against Filmer’s claim that the family was the model for the legitimacy of monarchy. Mary
Beth Norton, Founding Mothers and Fathers: Gendered Power and the Forming of
American Society (1996).
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to consider such a claim. Notice also that this does not entitle Goetz to a
similar claim. He argued that the state had abandoned him because of the
prior muggings, but no agent of the state stood at his elbow and told the
mugger to go home because mugging was inevitable or lawful. Notice also
that there is nothing that is remotely subjective about this argument; it is
not about hearts and minds, but about the law’s rules and the relation
between the defendant and the state. The best argument for Norman is that
she should be excused from her failure to wait and defer to the state’s use
of violence; that if the imminence requirement does not fully bar a claim
of self-defense in cases where there is no alternative, then Norman should
have been permitted to argue that, in her particular situation of extreme
state indifference, she should be excused from seeking alternatives.

I I I. TH E R EASONAB LE PE R SON R ECON S I D E R E D

How far am I willing to go with this claim? Am I willing to say that we
should eliminate the “reasonable person” altogether? As an intellectual
exercise, it seems at least worth exploring what would happen to the scholarly debate if we were to shift the emphasis away from the reasonable man
and his or her traits. This is not, let me repeat, not an argument for eliminating the reasonable person concept in jury instructions. Juries need the
metaphor because it invites emotional identification with the defendant in
ways that are intended to elicit restraint; given the ecological rationality of
the courtroom and the lack of legal expertise of jurors, the reasonable person may present the best way in which we can inspire the kind of emotional identification between the law-abiding and the lawbreaker. But to
say that this is the way that juries should be instructed in general is not to
decide the scholarly debate. There are plenty of scholarly controversies
that never appear in jury instructions; and there are plenty of jury instructions that do not determine the course of academic debate.32

32. To the extent my position here seems inconsistent it reflects the different nature of
the institutions at stake. Juries may be aided by the reasonable person as a heuristic, while
scholars may not. The scholarly institution aims toward the questioning of intellectual routine, something that would be enhanced by moving beyond the quick resort to the “objective” and “subjective.”
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To anthropomorphize the dispute has two scholarly tendencies. First, it
yields harsh and dichotomous positions. Feminists assert that the law
must reflect women’s “experience,” and men respond that it must reflect
“their” experience. There is nothing in this rather personalized debate that
addresses the question whether the same rules are being applied to men
and women: it is like two people shouting “I’m right,” “No you’re not.”
This can yield rather extreme claims as we can see from the Norman case.
“Do you really mean to say that women are justified in killing men in their
sleep?” ask men in grave fear for their lives. “Do you really mean to say
that a woman must be tortured for years in ways that are tantamount to
slavery before she can act to protect herself and her family?” reply the
women. In my own view, there are rather serious sex equality problems
with self-defense law, in the confused meanings of imminence and in the
application of faux retreat rules; these are caused by applying heuristics
borrowed from an old ecological rationality of family and gender. One
cannot see such conflicts, however, if one is only looking for a person.
As an analytic matter, taking the reasonable person out of the scholarly
inquiry shows us how anthropomorphic forms may divert us into greater
theoretical debates, debates about standards and rules, norms and facts,
etc. (identified above) that are principally induced by form, not substance.
Perhaps more importantly, it also forces us to label as subjective anything
that qualifies the prevailing majoritarian norm. This delegitimizes what is
almost universally admitted to be legitimate by legal scholars: that the
criminal law must both release but also restrain majoritarian norms, must
be attentive not only to general societal rules of behavior but also to the
“rule of law” (restraint). The great debates about subjective and objective
standards are debates about equality. The “reasonable person” inevitably
“flattens” the analysis, forcing us to whipsaw between hypermajoritarian
views (the standard of the law-abiding) and hyperminoritarian views (the
standard of the particular defendant).
The advocate of subjective standards, and in particular the reasonable
woman standard, will reply that I am too quick to ignore the achievements
of the innovation. Let me, then, make my position clear: To the extent
that the “reasonable woman” standard really means a standard that does
not penalize women for being women, it remains not only just but also
required by the equal protection clause. But the argument’s form may have
its costs—belief that bias has been overcome and that subjectivity alone can
illuminate the remaining double standards in the law (which it cannot).
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If women can only win their equal protection claims by enclosing them
within an alternative discourse of syndromes, so be it; but that does not
mean that this form of “winning” will not have—and has not had—its
costs, including a vast amount of backlash, and acceptance of a far weaker
kind of equality than might have been achieved with a stronger frontal
assault on the law’s double standards.
For men to judge women by the standards of men, given that gender
identity is in part constructed by the use of violence, is to create a double
standard.33 To the extent the “reasonable woman” standard fought that tendency, it must be considered a victory. But it was not a victory without cost.
Long before the reasonable woman standard appeared on the scene, the law
said that characteristics such as the defendant’s height and weight and prior
violent encounters between the parties were relevant to self-defense claims.
Why then did women need a special “subjective woman” standard?34 They
needed it because social meanings were likely to bend the law: the jury was
more likely to resort to gender heuristics to apply norms than to the law’s
standards of comparison. Put in other words, the jury was more likely to
ask the wrong question (would a man, following male norms of use of violence, have felt the need to use violence in an intimate relationship?) than
the right question (if men in the O.K. Corral could use violence at the
movement of a finger, why shouldn’t she be able to use violence?).35
Without some kind of corrective, there is every reason to believe that the
jury will not see women as “legitimate” users of violence, and instead apply
a rule that emphasizes their stereotypical role as pacifist caretakers.
The question comes down to how the law best protects against prejudicial heuristics borrowed from other institutions (whether the institutions be ones of race or sex or something else). I worry that the focus on
the reasonable woman or man simply intensifies the focus on identity,

33. The use of violence is in fact a marker of gender; women’s identity is socially
wrapped up in their role in relation, as caretakers, mothers, wives.
34. The truth is that a subjective component of self-defense is quite old; it can be found
in a variety of nineteenth-century cases; it can be found there because social contexts—new
settlement of the region, widespread violence, and the O.K. Corral—appeared to require
it. A move to the pocket, a step toward a gun were “signals” of violence in a violent world,
just as the same can be the case in a violent home. See Nourse, supra note 6.
35. The difference between these queries, one will notice, is that in the first the situation is defined as an intimate relationship.
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without any corresponding illumination of the persistent role of heuristics
in law application. None of the arguments (about the equal application of
retreat or imminence or the role of the state) can be made by focusing on
subjectivity or mind alone. Indeed, to the extent that the subjectivity standard increases the commitment of women as well as men to an anthropomorphic standard, it may obscure equality questions which are, by their
nature, comparative affairs.
The objective/subjective standard debate should end. It is a dead end
analytically. This is not because, as some critics have said, the criminal law
has suddenly gone “soft.”36 It is because the reasonable person inquiry
requires something more than a person. The subjective/objective debate
tends to keep us arguing about whether we are creating “special” new rules
for favored and disfavored classes when the real hard work is in the law’s
history, application, and meaning. Perhaps we think we are being “theoretical” by arguing about subjectivity and objectivity. As far as I can tell, it
simply invites students and scholars to talk about themselves. I understand
that, for many, doctrine is beneath their contempt, but theory ungrounded
in context is nothing more than a fairy tale. The criminal law deserves better; this is one area where theory is not simply about people’s careers, but
people’s lives.

36. See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, Moral Judgment: Does the Abuse Excuse Threaten Our
Legal System? (1997); Alan Dershowitz, The Abuse Excuse and Other Cop-Outs, Sob
Stories, and Evasions of Responsibility (1994).

